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NOTES AND COMMENTS
same policy behind the move to empower courts to render declaratory
judgments furnishes a sound argument. The use of this method
would spare the plaintiff whom the ordinance effects the necessity of
choosing between a curtailment of operations to conform to the
ordinance or the stigma of defending a criminal prosecution and risking an adverse result, with consequent fine or sentence.28 One who
tries in good faith to obey valid laws and ordinances should not be
forced by the courts to become a lawbreaker in order to protect his
constitutional rights, on the now exploded assumption that such a
procedure constitutes an "adequate remedy" at law.
PEYTON B. ABBOTT, JR.
Evidence-Impeaching Witness by Showing Religious Belief
Can a witness be impeached by inquiring into his religious faith?
This is one of the principal questions raised in State v. Beal,' the
dramatic murder trial growing out of the recent Gastonia strike disturbances. The opinion expressly avoids a definite answer, 'but general phases of the problem may profitably 'be considered.
Competency and Credibility
The common law idea of purging the witness box of prejudiced
and inferior witnesses has been superseded by a more enlightened
technique. Those qualities which formerly prevented the witness
from testifying at all-interest, infamy, and coverture-are now considered on the question of how much credit, conceding him to be
competent, is to be given to the witness 'by the triers of fact.2 This
change has been facilitated by the broad scope of the theory of testimonial impeachment. All matters which give rise to an inference
or chain of inferences leading to the conclusion that the witness is
presently lying are relevant.3 The grounds of attack most commonly
accepted as thus relevant are those which formerly formed the basis
"In the recent case of Standard Oil Co. v. City of Charlottesville, 42 F.
(2d) 88 (C. C. A. 4th., 1930), plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement of
an ordinance intended to be a substitute for a zoning ordinance, which the
city was without power to pass under the circumstances. The District Court
held the ordinance valid, denied the injunction. Reversed, with instructions
that the injunction would lie, because the penalty provided for violation was
so great that it would be dangerous to test the validity in a criminal prosecution. Parker, Circuit Judge, quotes from Terrace v. Thompson, supra note 24,
to the effect that "the legal remedy must be as complete, practical and efficient
as that which equity could afford."
1199 N. C.276, 154 S.E. 604 (1930).
22 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) § 876.

3Ibid., §877.
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for excluding the witness: 1. Defects of organic capacity. 2. Character. 3. Bias, interest, and corruption. 4 But difference of opinion
exists as to what phases of these generalized qualities-particularly
of character-are relevant; and the whole problem is complicated by
a mass of detailed rules, predicated on varying reasons of policy, as
to how these qualities shall 'be evidenced.
The religious belief of the witness fits anomalously into this
scheme of changing emphasis from the exclusionary to the impeaching process. It has not -been so generally removed as a testimonial
disqualification 5 as have interest, infamy, and coverture, and the
question of its relevancy for impeachment purposes is not so readily
solved.
In Jurisdictions with Religious Test for Competency
North Carolina is one of the minority jurisdictions retaining the
common law rule which required the witness to believe in a God who
will punish false swearing in this world or the next as a requisite of
competency. 6 In such jurisdictions logically it should be allowable
'Ibid., c. XXX.
'Wigmore (§§518 and 1816) propounds the theory that religious belief has

never been considered strictly a testimonial qualification.

Such belief is sig-

nificant only as a qualification to take the oath, and the oath exists to subject a
person possessed of the faculties (testimonial qualifications) considered inherently necessary for a capacity to tell the truth to the stimulus to tell it. At
common law the oath requirement-"a prophylactic rule"-vas important
enough to exclude all testimony which was not generated from its impulse.
This elusive distinction might have a practical application in construing at
least one of a fairly commorn type of statute. N. M. ANN. STAT. §2165 provides: "Hereafter in the courts of this state no person shall be disqualified to
give evidence on account of any disqualification known to the common law, but
all such common law disqualifications may be shown for the purpose of affecting the credibility of any such witness and for no other purpose.

. .

."

A

legitimate construction would be that want of religious belief was not a testimonial disqualification and is thus not covered by the statute. However, the
express wording of the following unfortunate statutes would have to be disregarded to prevent impeachment by religious belief: NEV. REV. LAWS §5419
(". . . Facts which by the common law would cause the exclusion of witnesses
may still 'be shown for the purpose of affecting their credibility.....") ; Nn.
Comp. STAT. (1922) §8845; IowA CODE (1927) §3637, State v. Elliott, 45 Iowa
486 (1877) ; Searcy v. Miller, 57 Iowa 613, 10 N. W. 912 (1881).
'Shaw v. Moore, 49 N. C. 25 (1856); Omichund v. Barker, 1 Ark. 45
(1744) ; Note (1899) 42 L. R. A. 553; Biggs, Religiowt Belief as Qualificationof
a Witness (1929) 8 N. C. L. Ray. 31. In State v. Pitt, 166 N. C. 268, 80 S.E.
1060 (1914) it was held that the ruling of competency of the trial judge was
conclusive, although the proffered witness had stated that he did not know
what would happen to him for lying other than imprisonment. Adams, J., in
Lanier v. Bryan, 184 N. C. 235, 114 S.E. 6 (1922) interprets this decision as
retaining the common law requirements in their pristine vigor. The finding
of the trial court is conclusive, he argues, because it implies a finding of the
"requisite facts," and he quotes the language of Pearson, J., in Shaw v.
Moore, to the effect that one of the requisite facts is fear of punishment by
the laws of God.
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to impeach a witness by showing a lack of the exact theological belief
required for competency, and his statements should be open to contradiction on the ground that the matter is not collateral.7 Practically
this exact information could not be elicited from the witness or
proved extrinsically without opening up a broader inquiry, particularly when the course pursued consisted in contradiction. The cases
abound with examples of crudely inquisitorial examinations of the
witness' religious beliefs. 8 The abuses to which this course of questioning is subject by its inevitable appeal to the jury's prejudices
furnish a cogent reason to exclude all evidence of religious belief for
impeachment purposes. A better solution would be to remove the
logical necessity by abolishing religious belief as one of the requisites
of competency. New Hampshire, the only state retaining religious
belief as a testimonial qualification which was found to rule on the
form of impeachment in issue, properly disallows it. But the reason
assigned-repugnance to the spirit of American institutions-is
naive. 9
In Jurisdictionswithout Religious Test for Competency
The vast majority of states have abolished the testimonial disqualification of want of belief in a God who punishes for perjury.
The weight of authority in these jurisdictions is against allowing
inquiry into the religious belief of a witness as a form of impeachment. Statutes in Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska,
Nevada, and Tennessee allow it.1° It is disallowed by statute in
Arizona, Connecticut, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont,
and Washington." In California, Kansas, and Kentucky constitutional and statutory provisions removing religious belief as a requisite
'2 WIGmopE EVIDENCE (1923) §§1003 and 1020 as to what matter is collateral.
'E.g., Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Mayes, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 187, 80 S.- W.

1096 (1904).
' N. H. Pun. LAWS (1926) c. 336, §23; Free v. Buckingham, 59 N. H. 219
(1879).
" GA. ANN. CoDE (Michie, 1926) §5857, Donkle v. Kohn, 44 Ga. 266 (1871);
IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) §§560-1, Snyder v. Nations, 5 Blackf. 295
(Ind. 1840); Iowa, supra note 5; MAss. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 233, §19; Hunscorn v. Hunscom, 15 Mass. 184 (1818) ; Com. v. Buzzell, 16 Pick. 153 (1834) ;
Com. v. Burke, 16 Gray 33 (1860) ; Allen v. Guarante, 253 Mass. 152, 148 N.
E. 461 (1925); Nebraska, supra note 5; Nevada supra note 5; TENN. ANN.
CoDE (Shannon, 1917) §5593. See Odell v. Kopper, 52 Tenn. 73, 77 (1871).
"Ariz. Const. II, §12; CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1918) §5705 (disallowed by clear

implication); MicH. ComP. LAWS (Cahill, 1915) §4336, People v. Jenness, 5
Mich. 305 (1858); Omz. LAws (Olson, 1920) §731; PA. STAT. (West, 1920)
§21834; VT. GEN. LAws (1917) §1895; Wash. Const. I, §11.
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of competency-along with constitutional guaranties of enjoyment of
civil capacities irrespective of religious faith and freedom of religious
worship-have been held to disclose a legislative intent to exclude
such evidence for impeachment purposes. 12 England rules against it
on the ground of its prejudicial effect. 3 The Maine court considers
unfair surprise of the impeached witness as a reason inter alia for its
exclusion.' 4 Louisiana intimates categorically that it should be excluded, 15 while Illinois excludes it on the threefold ground of repugnance to constitutional guaranties, irrelevance, and prejudice. 10 The
question must be regarded as unsettled in New York, 17 Ohio, and
South Carolina,' 8 and the other states appear not to have ruled on it.
'People v. Copsey, 71 Cal. 548, 12 Pac. 721 (1887) ; Dickinson v. Beal,

10 Kan. App. 233, 62 Pac. 724 (1900) ; L. & N. Ry. Co. v. Mayes, supra note
8; Bush v. Com., 80 Ky. 244 (1882).
The provisions of the North Carolina Constitution guaranteeing freedom
of religious worship (I, §26) and disqualifying for office those who deny the
existence of Almighty God (VI, §8) would seem to bear no logical connection
with the problem in hand. However, Pearson, J., in Shaw v. Moore, supra
note 6, at 31, said arguendo that had the strict common law excluding Jews
and Christians who did not believe in future rewards not been changed to admit
them by Omichund v. Barker, supra note 6, it would have been so changed by
I, §26 (then §19 of declaration of rights). If this tenuous premise be accepted, it follows that a fortiori this provision would operate to admit atheists.
Its supposed curative power might also be easily extended the next step to
prevent the form of impeachment in issue, particularly in view of the looseness
of the original idea that to exclude Jews and Christians of irregular conviction as to the hereafter would be unconstitutional because it would be "to
degrade and persecute them for 'opinion's sake.'" This argument must be rejected at its first step. It is untenable to hold that to exclude a witness on
religious grounds is to deprive him of worshipping as he pleases.
"Darby v. Ouseley, 1 H. & N. 1, 156 E. R. 1093 (1856). But cf. Bradlaugh v. Edwards, 11 C. B. N. S. 377, 142 E. R. 843 (1861).
"Holley v. Webster, 21 Me. 461 (1842) (Held improper to show that witness had said that he intended now to serve the devil as long as he had served
the Lord; that he had a pack of cards with him which he carried about in
his pocket and called them his bible.) The Me. statute is ambiguous. "No person is an incompetent witness on account of his religious belief, but he is subject'to the test of credibility." M. REv. STAT. (1916) c. 87, §111.
1" See State v. Dyer, 154 La. 379, 97 So. 563, 564 (1923).
" Starks v. Schlensky, 128 Ill. App. 1 (1906).
1 People v. McGarren, 17 Wend. 460 (1837)
(allowed); see Stanbro v.
Hopkins, 28 Barb. 265 (N. Y. 1858) (dictum that it is allowable). But see
Gibson v. Am. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 37 N. Y. 580, 584 (1868) (dictum that it
is not allowable) ; Brink v. Stratton, 176 N. Y. 150, 68 N. E. 148, 150 (1903)
(inconsistent dicta in seriatim opinions). In People v. Most, 128 N. Y. 108,
27 N. E. 970 (1891) the objection was held frivolous.
"Clinton v. State, 33 Ohio St. 27 (1877) (Defendant questioned on crossexamination as to his belief in God and future state of rewards and punishments. Held, prior inconsistent statements could not be shown) ; State v.
Turner, 36 S. C. 534, 15 S. E. 602 (1892) (similar holding). Under the true
rutle as to the matters on which prior contradictory statements 'may be shown,
these decisions are capable of two interpretations: 1. Religious belief is a
proper inquiry for impeachment, but may be shown only by the witness. 2. The
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Wigmore dismisses the problem summarily.1 9 On the whole the
decisions reveal no tendency to resolve the issue rationally into a
question of relevancy.
It is generally held allowable to impeach the credibility of the
declarant of a dying declaration by showing a lack of religious faith,
and the reason underlying the exceptional admission of this hearsay
testimony would seem to justify such a course.2 0 Also it seems gen2 1
erally allowable to use evidence of religious belief substantively,
although the possibility of prejudice inherent in such evidence would
seem equal to that in evidence of defendant's insurance in a personal
injury action. The familiar ban on the latter might be extended to
cover both.
No argument has been made that testimony of religious belief is
proper for impeachment as character evidence. Language in the instant case gives opening for such an argument, 22 and it might find
support in jurisdictions like North Carolina where the witness is
impeached by evidence of his general character rather than his veracity-character. 23 However, belief is not so clearly an element of
character that the admission of this prejudicial evidence is required.
It is fair to conclude that those jurisdictions which allow inquiry
into the witness' religious faith to discredit him have lost sight of the
fact that the impeaching process is limited by the principle of relevancy. Unorthodox religious convictions, even though they extend
to the extremes of agnosticism and atheism, may quite often exist
because of honest intellectual doubts. It is untenable to argue that
there is a correlation between this kind of unorthodoxy and inveracity. That correlation which may exist between what Pope calls "blind
unbelief" and untruthfulness is so slight that the value of the
evidence is outweighed by the possibilities for prejudice with which it
is pregnant. Furthermore, it might be safely assumed that such effect
contradiction is error, because the evidence was inadmissible in the first instance. See note 7.
" 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) §936.
='Note (1922) 16 A. L. R. 411; (1929)

8 TENN. L. REv. 56.

' State v. Dyer, supra note 15 (Held proper to show to what religion witness
belonged to show improbability of his having been at a certain church). But
cf. Brundige v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. Rep. 596, 95 S. W. 527 (1906).
' State v. Beal, supra note 1, at 301. "It has been said that a man is what
he thinks, 'For as he thinketh in his heart, so is he.' Prov. 23 :7." Compare
language of Hunt, C. J., in Gibson v. Am. Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra note
17, at 584. "Conduct and life, as distinguished from belief, give the standard
of character."
" Note (1927) 5 N. C. L. REv. 340.
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as it does have will appear in the witness' reputation for veracity or
his general reputation in the community-a familiar inquiry.
Conclusion
The witness box should not be made more forbidding to persons
of potential value as witnesses by the fear of a scrutiny of their personal thoughts. The 1931 Legislature should adopt the remedy accepted by the majority of American states by removing religious
belief as a test of competency and prohibiting evidence of it to impeach. The Pennsylvania statute is a desirable model: "No witness
shall be questioned in any judicial proceeding concerning his religious
belief; nor shall any evidence be heard upon the subject for the
24
purpose of affecting either his competency or credibility."
JAmES

H. CHADBOURN.

Federal Procedure-Transfer of Cases Between Law
and Equity Sides of Court
The case of Clarksbury Trust Co. v. Conmwrcial Casualty Co.'
was an action at law in a Federal District Court for West Virginia to
recover on a bond issued -by the defendant to cover a deposit of the
plaintiff in a Pennsylvania bank. The deposit in question was upon
a time certificate and was the only one contemplated in the security
transaction; the bond, however, clearly applied only to deposits subject to check. The plaintiff's declaration alleged that this was due to
a mutual mistake of law as to the meaning of the coverage clause in
the bond. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. Held,
on appeal, reversed and remanded with directions to transfer the case
to the equity side for reformation, with leave to amend the pleadings
and to introduce further evidence.
The questions of transfer between the law and equity sides of the
Federal Courts arise under the Judicial Code, section 274a, 2 which
provides: "That in case any of said courts (courts of the United
States) shall find that a suit at law should have been brought in equity
or a suit in equity should have been brought at law, the court shall
order any amendments to the pleadings which may be necessary to
conform them to the proper practice. Any party to the suit shall have
the right, at any stage of the cause, to amend his pleadings so as to
626 (C. 1920)
C. A. §21834.
4th, 1930).
140PA.F.STAT.
(2d) (West,
'38 STAT. 956 (1915), 28 U. S. C. A., §397 (1928).

